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 Effects of Corporate Policies 
and Governance Practices on 
Ownership Structure: Evidence 
from Chilean Firms*1
ABSTRACT
We analyze the effects of financing policies, dividends, and corporate 
governance on ownership structure in Chilean companies. We used a sample 
of 185 companies listed on the Santiago Stock Exchange that answered the 
NCG 341 survey on Corporate Governance Practices in 2013. The two-limit 
Tobit regression (TLTR) results show that debt and dividend policies exert a 
negative effect on controlling shareholder ownership and a positive effect on 
minority shareholder ownership. The results show that these policies facilitate 
control over corporate management determined by the interests of controlling 
shareholders, as well as protect minority shareholders’ rights by complementing 
their monitoring role. Corporate governance practices have significant effects 
on the ownership structure of Chilean companies.
Keywords: Financing policy, dividend, corporate governance, ownership 
structure. 
JEL code: G32, G35, G38.
Efectos de las políticas y prácticas de gobierno corporativo 
sobre la estructura de propiedad: evidencia de compañías 
chilenas
RESUMEN
Este artículo se propone analizar el impacto de las políticas de financia-
miento, dividendos y gobierno corporativo sobre la estructura de propiedad 
en compañías chilenas. Se usó una muestra de 185 compañías listadas en la 
Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago, que contestaron la encuesta NCG 341 sobre 
Prácticas de Gobierno Corporativo en 2013. Los resultados de las regresiones 
Tobit de dos límites (TLTR) demuestran que las políticas de endeudamiento y de 
* The University of Concepción financially supported this research. Remaining errors are 
the sole responsibility of the authors.
Artículo de investigación
© 2018 Universidad Católica de Colombia.
Facultad de Ciencias 
Económicas y Administrativas. 
Todos los derechos reservados
Universidad de Concepción 
Concepción, Chile 
270
Finanz. polit. econ., ISSN 2248-6046, Vol. 10, N.° 2, julio-diciembre, 2018, pp. 269-286
dividendos negativamente afectan la propiedad de los accionistas controladores 
y protegen los derechos de los accionistas minoritarios al complementar su rol 
de monitoreo. Las prácticas de gobierno corporativo tienen efectos significativos 
sobre la estructura de propiedad de las compañías chilenas.
Palabras clave: financiamiento, dividendos, gobierno corporativo, 
estructura de propiedad.
Efeitos das políticas e práticas de governo  
corporativo sobre a estrutura de propriedade:  
evidência de companhias chilenas
RESUMO
Este artigo propõe a analisar o impacto das políticas de financiamento, 
dividendos e governo corporativo sobre a estrutura de propriedade em com-
panhias chilenas. Utiliza-se uma amostra de 185 companhias relacionadas na 
Bolsa de Comércio de Santiago que responderam à pesquisa NCG 341 sobre 
Práticas de Governo Corporativo em 2013. Os resultados das regressões Tobit 
de dois limites (TLTR) demonstram que as políticas de endividamento e de 
dividendos afetam negativamente a propriedade dos acionistas controladores e 
protegem os direitos dos acionistas minoritários ao complementar seu papel de 
monitoramento. As práticas de governo corporativo têm efeitos significativos 
sobre a estrutura de propriedade das companhias chilenas.
Palavras-chave: financiamento, dividendos, governo corporativo, es-
trutura de propriedade.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate ownership structure has been at the cen-
ter of analysis and discussion in the last decades 
due to the globalization of international markets. 
Literature concludes that factors such as debt, divi-
dends, growth opportunities, firm profitability, among 
many others, can explain the ownership structure 
of firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 1996; Baek et al., 2006; Céspedes et 
al., 2010). Whatever is the case, the way in which 
companies form their corporate ownership may have 
direct implications on the control of decisions and 
relationships between shareholders.
The characteristics of the institutional environ-
ment of countries could also be relevant to corporate 
ownership structure (La Porta et al., 1997; Mak & 
Li, 2001; Weiss & Richter, 2010; Hatem, 2014). In 
this sense, Latin American countries, and particu-
larly Chile, have an institutional environment that is 
governed by French civil law. Low legal protection 
for investors, which is a characteristic of these 
countries, may lead them to concentrate corporate 
ownership as a way to monitor investments and 
to achieve a positive return on assets (Barclay 
& Holderness, 1989; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; La 
Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Anderson & Reeb, 2004). 
Thus, pyramidal ownership structures, which are 
highly concentrated and have a strong presence 
of business conglomerates, are recurrent in these 
countries.
This context provides a propitious space for 
wealth expropriation from minority shareholders 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Booth et al., 2001; Nenova, 
2003; Silva et al., 2006; Santiago & Brown, 2007). 
In Chile, during recent years, several events as-
sociated with bad corporate governance practices 
have highlighted not only the low legal protection 
of non-controlling investors, but also an economic 
deterioration due to discretionary decisions by con-
trolling shareholders. For example, La Polar in 2011, 
the case of CMPC and PISA in 2015, SQM in 2015, 
Masvida en 2017, among others, are some cases of 
public interest and important judicial reaches. These 
cases had relevant effects for different stakeholders.
The above mentioned facts justify the es-
tablishment of different control means to mitigate 
potential wealth expropriation problems caused by 
ownership concentration in Chile. In this matter, 
financing and dividend policies could play a signi-
ficant monitoring role on corporate management 
established by controlling shareholders. Several 
studies have corroborated this control role (Bae et 
al., 2002; Chu & Cheah, 2004; Baek et al., 2006). 
In addition, Chile’s entry into the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 
2010 has called into question the policies of corpo-
rate governance developed by Chilean companies 
and their degree of compliance with governance 
practices recommended by the international body. 
This fact has not yet been studied in Chile, nor its 
role on ownership structure.
We analyze the effects of financing, dividend, 
and corporate governance policies on the owners-
hip structure of Chilean companies. Our research 
contributes empirical evidence on Chile and other 
emerging countries governed by French civil law in 
two aspects. First, we analyze the potential non-
linear effects of financing and dividend policies on 
ownership structure. Although many studies support 
that both policies have a substitute control effect in 
relation to controlling shareholder ownership and 
a complementary control effect on minority share-
holder ownership, nonlinearity would suggest that 
these effects are not persistent. Second, we study 
the impact of corporate governance policies sugges-
ted by the OECD on ownership structure. We seek 
to measure whether these governance practices 
have the capacity to mitigate or exacerbate wealth 
expropriation.
In order to comply with these objectives, we 
used a cross-sectional sample of 185 companies 
listed on the Santiago Stock Exchange in 2013, 
which answered the survey of the Standard of 
General Character 341 (Encuesta Norma de Carácter 
General 341, henceforth NCG 341), prepared by 
the Superintendence of Securities and Insurance 
(SSI). Results indicate that debt and dividend po-
licies exert a negative impact on controlling share-
holder ownership and a positive impact on minority 
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shareholder ownership. Both policies contribute to 
mitigating wealth expropriation, although their non-
monotonic effect indicates that such an impact is not 
persistent. Thus, in case of higher debt levels and 
higher dividend rates, it is possible to observe a higher 
degree of ownership concentration, which transfers 
the financial risk of debt to minority shareholders, re-
ducing their participation. The corporate governance 
practices outlined by the OECD have a similar effect.
After this introduction, Section 2 reviews lite-
rature concerning the effects of financing, dividends, 
and corporate governance policies on ownership 
structure, and presents the hypotheses of this work. 
Section 3 describes the variables and methods used 
in this article. Section 4 presents the results obtai-
ned, while Section 5 culminates with the conclusions 
and extensions of this study.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS
Ownership structure in Latin America is characte-
rized by high concentration, pyramidal form, and 
a significant presence of business conglomerates 
(Lins, 2003; Lefort, 2005). Leal and De Oliveira 
(2002) point out that the five largest shareholders 
of Brazilian firms make up, on average, 58% of 
ownership, while Lefort and Walker (2000) indicate 
that this figure is approximately 80% in Chile. Apreda 
(2000) and De Michele (2002) point out that in the 
20 largest Argentinean companies, controllers own 
almost two thirds of market capital.
Particularly, in Chile, this business context, 
together with low levels of legal protection for inves-
tors, has led to wealth expropriation from minority 
shareholders. Thus, monitoring exercised by finan-
cing, dividend, and corporate governance policies 
may be relevant to ownership structure.
Effects of financing policy on 
ownership structure
Financing policy may be relevant to corporate ow-
nership structure, although international evidence 
has shown a lack of consensus regarding the effects 
of debt decisions on corporate ownership.
 Some studies claim that corporate debt 
levels have a negative impact on ownership concen-
tration. In this line, the seminal study by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) points out that a higher level of cor-
porate debt is associated with a more diluted (less 
concentrated) ownership structure. The authors 
suggest that debt could have a monitoring effect 
on company management, which would replace 
the controlling role typically exercised by majority 
owners. Other works, such as those by Leland and 
Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984), and Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), reaffirm that debt reduces agency 
costs caused by the dilution of ownership due to 
control effects on discretional decisions made by 
corporate governance. In this context, Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) add that when ownership is diluted, 
debt issuance contributes to reducing wealth expro-
priation, in positive association with non-controlling 
shareholder ownership.
There is also evidence supporting the des-
cribed results in emerging markets. Du and Dai 
(2005) analyzed ownership structure in a sample of 
firms in East Asia. Their results indicate that firms 
with less concentrated ownership structures use 
debt as a means to avoid losing corporate control. 
In Latin America, Booth et al. (2001) add that firms 
use debt less than other markets with similar struc-
tural characteristics. According to this, debt has a 
greater control effect. Chong and Lopez de Silanes 
(2007) and Céspedes et al. (2010) argue that debt 
significantly reduces ownership concentration and 
increases minority shareholders ownership, miti-
gating wealth expropriation. This leads us to the 
following hypothesis:
	 H1:	Debt	has	a	negative	(positive)	effect	on	
majority (minority) shareholder ownership.
Other part of the international evidence 
describes a positive effect of debt on ownership 
concentration. Bae et al. (2002) and Baek et al. 
(2006) point out that this positive relationship su-
ggests that debt exercises a complementary mo-
nitoring role in relation to ownership concentration. 
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This fact facilitates wealth expropriation from mi-
nority shareholders. Hatem (2014) supports this 
result in a study comparing German companies (civil 
law) and U.K. companies (common law). In Chile, 
Morales et al. (2013) have also corroborated this 
result in a study that used 67 companies listed on 
the Santiago Stock Exchange between 1990 and 
2007. They add that this complementary relationship 
is an indicator that Chilean companies have better 
access to bank financing and bond markets, so it is 
not necessary to distribute capital to obtain funds. 
In any case, higher debt would have a negative 
effect on minority shareholder ownership, as it would 
transfer the financial risk of higher debt. Céspedes 
et al. (2010) conclude that these findings could be 
explained by a non-linear relationship between debt 
levels and ownership structure. In Chile, this fact has 
not been investigated so far, leading us to formulate 
the following hypothesis:
	 H2:	Debt	has	a	non-linear	effect	on	ownership	
structure. 
The effect of dividend policy on 
ownership structure
Dividend policy can also become a determinant of 
ownership structure. A relevant part of international 
studies indicate that dividends are negatively related 
to ownership concentration and positively to owner-
ship dilution. Rozeff (1982) proposed that ownership 
concentration is associated with lower dividends; 
thus, as ownership structure becomes more diluted, 
firms’ dividends should increase. Agency theory 
holds that dividends would help mitigate wealth 
expropriation derived from a conflict of interests bet-
ween minority and majority shareholders (Shleifer 
& Vishny 1997; La Porta et al., 1999). The rela-
tionship described transforms dividend policy into 
a means of control, which replaces the monitoring 
role exercised by ownership concentration over 
agency conflict. A wide range of literature has do-
cumented and sustained this result (Faccio & Lang, 
2001; Mancinelli & Aydin, 2006; Setia-Atmaja, 2009; 
López-Iturriaga & Lima, 2014; Mori & Ikeda, 2015). 
Another aspect that complements this analysis is 
institutional environment. In countries governed by 
civil law, low legal protection for investors could also 
be replaced by higher dividend rates, which would 
reinforce a trade-off with ownership concentration. 
In general, research in Chile has evidenced that 
dividends contribute to controlling agency costs 
(Maquieira & Danús, 1998; Maquieira & Moncayo, 
2004). More recently, Morales et al. (2013) have 
demonstrated that dividends are negatively related 
to controlling shareholder ownership and positively 
to the second largest shareholder, leading us to the 
following hypothesis:
 H3: Dividend policy has a negative (positi-
ve)	effect	on	majority	(minority)	shareholder	
ownership.
However, there are studies that oppose the 
traditional view of negatively relating dividends to 
ownership concentration. Faccio et al. (2001), in a 
study comparing firms in Asia and Europe, found 
evidence that more concentrated ownership struc-
tures pay higher dividends. In line with this result, 
Ramli (2010) adds that ownership concentration is 
a means of protection for investors, which comple-
ments dividend policy. Burkart and Panunzi (2006) 
point out that this relation occurs when greater 
legal protection for investors proposes a means of 
substitute monitoring, which correlates positively 
with ownership concentration. If this is the case, 
concentrated pyramidal ownership structures with 
high family ownership may be related to higher divi-
dends (Bradford et al., 2013). Roy (2015) adds that 
this context, together with the participation of family 
shareholders in minority shareholder ownership, 
would be another argument for a positive relation-
ship with dividend policy. Furthermore, he states 
that such a relationship would become negative 
for non-family minority shareholders. Such is the 
case in Chile, where, in addition, there is a legal 
minimum payment of 30%, which could alter the 
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effects of dividend policy on ownership structure. 
The collusion of these effects could be due to the 
fact that this relationship is not linear, leading us to 
formulate the following hypothesis:
	 H4:	Dividend	policy	has	a	non-linear	effect	on	
ownership structure.
Effects of corporate governance on 
ownership structure
Another issue that has gained increasing ground in 
discussions regarding corporate ownership structure 
is corporate governance policy. Fama and Jensen 
(1983a, 1983b) argue that the basis of good corpora-
te governance is centered on relationships between 
control and business management. At this point, 
relationships between control and minority share-
holders may be affected by corporate governance 
policies, since these investors perceive it as a mu-
tually protective medium. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
and Klapper and Love (2004) corroborate this view 
and add that corporate governance performance is 
positively related to investor protection measures.
In countries governed by civil law, where 
protection mechanisms are poor and ownership 
concentration is higher, corporate governance roles 
become more relevant. This scenario provides a 
propitious space for majority shareholders to expro-
priate wealth from minority shareholders (Renders 
& Gaeremynck, 2012). However, Hung (1998) 
points out that corporate governance is constituted 
to align the interests of all internal and external 
agents with company objectives. In this sense, 
mitigating conflicts of interest, wealth expropriation, 
and ensuring firm performance would be the main 
functions of corporate governance. These corporate 
governance practices could lead firms to a state of 
greater financial performance consistent with the 
shareholder wealth maximization objective (Zahra 
& Pearce, 1989; Brown & Caylor, 2004). These 
facts are directly related to controlling and minority 
shareholders ownership.
There is little evidence in this regard in Chile. 
Works such as those by Lefort and Walker (2007) 
do nothing more than suggest that discrepancies 
between shareholders have implications on the 
stock market. However, no study analyzes the effect 
of corporate governance mechanism on ownership 
structure in Chilean companies. In addition, during 
2010, Chile joined the OECD. For Chile, this meant 
fulfilling certain economic, financial, and public policy 
objectives. With regard to the corporate governance 
of firms, agency theory suggests that firms develop 
certain governance practices to benefit various in-
vestors and other stakeholders. The SSI developed 
the NCG 341 survey in order to assess the degree 
of compliance of governance practices with those 
recommended by this institution. The effect of these 
policies on the configuration of the ownership struc-
ture in Chilean companies has not been investigated 
yet, and, for this reason, we formulated the following 
hypothesis:
 H5: Corporate governance policies have a 
positive	effect	on	majority	and	minority	sha-
reholder ownership.
DATA AND METHODS
Research data
The data used in this investigation corresponds 
to 185 companies listed on the Santiago Stock 
Exchange for 2013, which answered the NCG 341 
survey. Pertinent information to this company sam-
ple was extracted from three sources of information: 
(a) results of the NCG 341 survey obtained from the 
SSI, (b) the 2013 financial statements compiled from 
the Economática® database, and (c) dividends co-
llected from annual reports and minutes of ordinary 
shareholder meetings. Table 1 presents the study 
variables.
The research-dependent variable is ow-
nership structure, which is measured through 
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two proxies. The SHARE1 variable measures con-
troller shareholder ownership as a way of calculating 
ownership concentration, while SHARE5 measures 
minority shareholder ownership, and therefore ow-
nership structure dilution. These measures follow 
the suggestions of various studies (Santiago & 
Brown, 2007; Morales et al., 2013).
Corporate governance variables are mea-
sured as indicated in Table 1 and represent gover-
nance postulates specified by Fama and Jensen 
(1983a, 1983b). It is important to note that the NCG 
341 survey applied by the SSI aims to establish a 
dissemination mechanism regarding governance 
standards in Chilean corporations and their degree 
of compliance with the four principles of good cor-
porate governance practices recommended by the 
OECD. The survey, grouped into four categories, 
contains 19 questions of a binary nature, which 
were answered by the boards of the 185 companies. 
These four categories are based on the principles 
recommended by the OECD: (a) functioning of the 
board, (b) relationship with stakeholders, (c) execu-
tive compensation, and (d) internal control policies.
 Debt-to-equity ratio (LEV) and dividend 
payment rate (DIV) are variables associated with 
corporate policies. According to several studies, LEV 
is used as a means of control associated with owner-
ship structure. This control role could be substitute 
or complementary (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Booth et 
al., 2001; Bae et al., 2002). Dividend payment rate 
(DIV) is used as a form of cash flow distribution when 
there are conflicts of interest between managers and 
different shareholders (Chu & Cheah, 2004; Morales 
et al., 2013).
Other control variables are used in line with 
other studies. QTOB measures growth opportunities 
Table 1. 
Study variables
Variables Definition
A. Dependent variables
SHARE1 Controlling shareholder ownership Majority shareholder percentage of shares
SHARE5 Fifth-largest shareholder ownership Fifth largest shareholder percentage of shares
B. Characteristics of corporate governance
GP Good practices Dummy equal to 1 if it meets more than two categories
NCAT Number of categories met Number of categories met by the firm
BOARD Functioning of the board Dummy is 1 if firms meet this item by over 50%
STHOLD Relationship with stakeholders Dummy is 1 if firms meet this item by over 50%
EXECP Executive compensation Dummy is 1 if firms meet this item by over 50%
INCONT Internal control policy Dummy is 1 if firms meet this item by over 50%
C. Corporate policies
LEV Financing policy Debt-to-equity ratio
DIV Dividend policy Dividend payment rate to shareholders
D. Other control variables
QTOB Tobin’s Q Market-to-book ratio
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets
ROA Return on assets Net income to total assets ratio
ACOST Asset costs Operating expense to net sales ratio
AGE Age of the firm Years of company legal existence
FEXP Financial expenses Operating income to financial expenses ratio
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Economática and SSI.
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through the Tobin’s Q (La Porta et al., 2002), 
SIZE represents firm size (Thomsen & Pedersen, 
1996; Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997; Pindado & 
De la Torre, 2006), ROA is the return on assets 
(Krivogorsky, 2006), ACOST indicates agency costs 
(Ang et al., 2000), AGE is the firm’s age (Boeker, 
1989; Chibber & Majumdar, 1999; Claessens et 
al., 2000), and FEXP indicates financial expenses 
coverage ratio.
Econometric method
A two-limit Tobit regression (TLTR) model is used to 
determine the effect of debt, dividend, and corporate 
governance policies on ownership structure. The 
specified model is:
  
OSi=β0+β1CGi+β2LEVi+β3LEVi
2+β4DIVi+β5DIVi
2
+β6QTOBi+β7ROAi+β8ACOSTi+β9FEXPi+ 
β10SIZEi+β11AGEi+δ0DSector+εi
[1]
  
The variable OSi represents ownership 
structure measured by controlling shareholder 
ownership (SHARE1) and minority shareholder 
ownership (SHARE5). According to Table 1, CGi 
represents different dimensions of corporate go-
vernance developed by Chilean companies. LEVi 
is the debt-to-equity ratio, with which the effect of 
the financing policy is quantified, LEVi2 captures 
the potential non-monotonic effects of the financing 
policy on ownership structure, DIVi is the dividend 
payment rate, and DIVi2 quantifies the non-linear 
effect of this policy.
The model also includes controls through cer-
tain structural characteristics of the firms. Variables 
such as future growth opportunities measured by the 
Tobin’s Q (QTOBi), return on assets (ROAi), agency 
costs (ACOSTi), financial solvency measured by the 
financial expenses coverage ratio (FEXPi), company 
size (SIZEi) and their age (AGEi) represent these 
control variables. The model also includes dummy 
variables by economic sectors to control company 
differences (DSector). Finally, εi is the random resi-
dual of the model.
RESULT ANALYSIS
Sample description
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correla-
tions of variables in relation to ownership structure 
measurements.
Ownership structure variables showed large 
differences between controlling shareholder owner-
ship and the fifth-largest shareholder ownership. 
The latter was employed as an approximation to 
the position of minority shareholders. While con-
trollers concentrate 49.86% of ownership, minority 
shareholders own only 3.39%. In Latin American 
countries like Chile, such structures are common. 
The institutional environment based on French civil 
law, which is a characteristic of these countries, 
favors ownership concentration for controlling sha-
reholders, as well as wealth expropriation.
Variables characterizing corporate governan-
ce were developed through the NCG 341 survey. In 
general terms, it was observed that companies meet 
approximately two out of four corporate governan-
ce categories recommended by the OECD. More 
frequently used governance practices are internal 
control policies (INCONT), carried out by 54.27% of 
companies, and functioning of the board (BOARD), 
carried out by 52.34% of companies. Executive 
compensation policies (EXECP) were carried out 
by 51.44% of companies, and relationship with 
stakeholders (STHOLD) by 35.12%, which is the 
least frequently used policy. This last governance 
practice includes relationships maintained by com-
panies with different interest groups, such as bon-
dholders and minority shareholders, among others. 
Lower degrees of compliance demonstrated in this 
variable reveal companies’ lower concern for the 
rights of non-controlling investors. This policy is ne-
gatively and significantly correlated with controlling 
shareholder ownership, but positively with minority 
shareholder ownership.
 LEV, which represents financing policy, was 
measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, which is 1.88 
on average. This figure indicates that, on average, 
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sample companies were financed with 65.28% debt 
and 34.72% equity. On the other hand, dividend poli-
cy rates (DIV) show that, on average, 42.74% of the 
profit was distributed in payments to shareholders 
(amount calculated only for paying companies). In 
any case, it highlights the fact that both policies are 
negatively correlated with controlling shareholder 
ownership and positively with minority shareholder 
ownership. Evidence indicates that debt and divi-
dends are substitute means for monitoring in rela-
tion to ownership concentration, and they promote 
minority investor controlling rights.
 Regarding the structural characteristics of 
the sample companies, average growth opportuni-
ties (QTOB) were 1.21, accompanied by a 4.27% 
return of assets (ROA) and a 6.44 average financial 
expenses ratio (FEXP).  The average age (AGE) of 
companies was almost 40 years, with agency costs 
(ACOST) equivalent to 18.98% of sales.
Effects of financing, dividend, and 
corporate governance policies on 
ownership structure
 This section analyzes the regression indi-
cated in [1] to verify the effects of financing, divi-
dend, and corporate governance policies. Table 3 
shows the results of the regression applied on the 
dependent variable SHARE1, which is ownership 
concentration indicated by controlling shareholder 
participation.
 Coefficients confirmed the results obtained 
by previous studies for certain control variables. 
Company age (AGE) had no significant effect on ow-
nership concentration. Growth opportunities (QTOB) 
had a positive and significant effect on ownership 
concentration, which is consistent with La Porta et al. 
(2002). Greater opportunities for future growth cons-
titute a positive indicator of the economic potential 
Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variables Mean S.D. Correlation
A. Dependent variables
SHARE1 Controlling shareholder ownership (%) 49.86 82.37 1.00*** -0.24***
SHARE5 Fifth-largest shareholder ownership (%) 3.39 2.49 -0.24*** 1.00***
B. Corporate governance characteristics
GP Good practices 56.23 25.41 0.12*** 0.23***
NCAT Number of categories met 1.92 1.44 0.05*** 0.14***
BOARD Functioning of the board (% of firms) 52.34 50.45 0.22*** 0.17***
STHOLD Stakeholder relations (% of firms)  35.12 48.23 -0.16*** 0.21***
EXECP Executive compensation (% of firms) 51.44 50.15 -0.11*** 0.15***
INCONT Internal control policies (% of firms) 54.27 50.32 0.05*** 0.27***
C.  Corporate policies
LEV Financing policy 1.88 7.18 -0.21*** 0.15***
DIV Dividend policy 42.74 29.93 -0.29*** 0.18***
D. Other control variables
QTOB Tobin’s Q 1.21 1.86 0.17*** 0.09***
SIZE Firm size (MM$) 1,198,639 3,152,101 -0.06*** 0.09***
ROA Return on assets (%) 4.27 11.80 0.14*** 0.17***
ACOST Agency costs (%) 18.98 47.37 -0.18*** 0.09***
AGE Age of the firm (years) 39.98 31.32 0.09*** 0.03***
FEXP Financial expenses (factors) 6.44 13.57 0.11*** 0.24***
Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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majority shareholder ownership and debt are due to 
the need to not lose corporate control.
Dividend policy (DIV) also has a negative and 
non-linear (U-shaped) effect on controlling sharehol-
der ownership. These results support the H3 and 
H4 hypotheses, respectively. The result agrees with 
previous studies and points out that dividends are 
initially a means of proportional control in the face 
of loss of control by majority shareholders, dilution 
of ownership, and mitigation of agency conflicts 
between shareholders (Rozeff, 1982; Faccio & 
Lang, 2001; Mancinelli & Aydin, 2006; Setia-Atmaja, 
2009; Pindado et al., 2012; López-Iturriaga & Lima, 
2014; Mori & Ikeda, 2015). Dividend payments 
could reduce the future growth potential of firms 
and shareholder incentives to raise their share of 
ownership (Chu & Cheah, 2004). However, Lang 
and Litzenberger (1989) and Yoon and Starks (1995) 
indicate that raising dividends emits a positive signal 
regarding future performance, which in turn would 
encourage greater participation by controllers. Both 
results would be supported by the non-linear effect 
of dividend policy.
Finally, corporate governance variables pre-
sented mixed results. On the one hand, the majority 
development of good corporate governance prac-
tices (GP), the functioning of the board (BOARD), 
and internal control policies (INCONT) are variables 
that have a positive and significant impact on contro-
lling shareholder ownership. These results validate 
the H5 hypothesis. The effects of these variables 
indicate that ownership concentration is based on 
the strengthening of control mechanisms and a 
better decision-making process (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a, 1983b; Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Brown & 
Caylor, 2004).
On the other hand, policies that foster rela-
tionships with various stakeholders (STHOLD), as 
well as executive compensation (EXECP) have a 
significant negative effect, which goes against the 
H5 hypothesis. In Chile, a country characterized by 
using French civil law, the low protection of minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders would favor 
ownership concentration over controlling sharehol-
ders. This would even facilitate wealth expropriation 
of the company, leading shareholders to increase 
their participation as a way to obtain a fraction of 
this growth. Likewise, return on assets (ROA) and 
financial expenses (FEXP) had a positive effect on 
ownership concentration (Krivogorsky, 2006).
 Agency costs (ACOST) had an expected 
negative effect. In line with Berle and Means (1932), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Jensen (1986), 
higher agency costs were associated with less par-
ticipation by controlling shareholders. The potential 
loss of corporate control and the generation of addi-
tional expenses were related to ownership dilution 
and the weakening of monitoring mechanisms by 
controlling shareholders.
 Firm size (SIZE) had a negative effect 
on controlling shareholder ownership. This result 
reaffirms that larger firms are more expensive to 
manage for controllers due to structural and or-
ganizational complexity (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 1996; Pedersen & Thomsen, 
1997; Pindado & De la Torre, 2012). In this sense, 
the negative effects described are synonymous with 
lower degrees of control as companies increase 
in size.
There is a negative and significant effect 
on controlling shareholder ownership regarding 
financing policy (LEV). This result supports the H1 
hypothesis and suggests that both debt and ow-
nership concentration in majority shareholders are 
substitute means of control (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Diamond, 1984; Chong & Lopez de Silanes, 
2007; Céspedes et al., 2010). In this way, debt can 
externally substitute the monitoring role when ow-
nership is partially diluted. This negative effect could 
be common in Latin American countries like Chile, 
since debt is less used than equity as a source of fi-
nancing (Booth et al., 2001). On the other hand, debt 
effects are non-linear and have a U-shape, a fact 
that supports the H2 hypothesis. This result shows 
that debt acts as a substitute control for ownership 
concentration only when debt is low, and it is com-
plementary when leverage is high. This is in line with 
Du and Dai (2005) and Céspedes et al. (2010), who 
suggest that complementary relationships between 
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Table 3.  
Two-limit Tobit regression for controlling shareholder ownership, marginal effects
Variables
Dependent variable: Controlling shareholder ownership (SHARE1) measured as the percentage of stocks held 
by the controlling shareholder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Corporate governance characteristics
GP 0.183 0.173
(1.97)** (1.77)*
NCAT 0.008 0.002
(1.53) (0.93)
BOARD 0.123 0.138
(2.77)*** (2.92)***
STHOLD -0.149 -0.156
(-1.97)** (-2.01)**
EXECP -0.103 -0.074
(-1.75)* (-1.57)
INCONT 0.097 0.104
(1.69)* (1.75)*
B. Corporate policies
LEV -0.968 -1.023 -0.945 -0.993 -1.105 -1.003 -0.952
(-3.22)*** (-2.99)*** (-2.51)** (-2.74)*** (-3.03)*** (-3.37)*** (-3.07)***
LEV2 0.334 0.294 0.302 0.359 0.316 0.331 0.299
(2.91)*** (2.12)** (2.54)** (3.04)*** (2.95)*** (2.67)*** (3.11)***
DIV -0.036 -0.043 -0.039 -0.045 -0.049 -0.042 -0.044
(-2.26)** (-2.59)*** (-2.48)** (-2.66)*** (-2.89)*** (-2.47)** (-2.61)***
DIV2 0.019 0.026 0.021 0.025 0.028 0.024 0.023
(2.55)*** (2.87)*** (2.33)** (2.52)** (2.61)*** (3.03)*** (2.34)**
C. Other control variables
QTOB 2.961 2.579 2.985 3.002 2.741 2.904 2.654
(2.33)** (2.41)** (2.57)** (2.79)*** (2.59)*** (2.77)*** (2.37)**
ROA 0.056 0.061 0.057 0.055 0.059 0.051 0.060
(1.99)** (2.19)* (2.01)** (2.22)** (1.93)* (1.77)* (1.97)**
ACOST -0.225 -0.268 -0.218 -0.237 -0.291 -0.283 -0.201
(-1.29) (-1.86)* (-1.54) (-1.61) (-1.77)* (-1.91)* (-1.59)*
FEXP 0.121 0.137 0.127 0.142 0.139 0.123 0.133
(2.66)*** (2.52)** (2.48)** (2.85)*** (2.37)** (2.61)*** (2.79)***
SIZE -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003
(-2.31)** (-2.03)** (-2.22)** (-2.15)** (-2.48)** (-2.32)** (-2.58)***
AGE 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.89) (0.77) (0.81) (0.93) (0.69) (0.75) (0.67)
Dummy sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.46
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
Wald (44.57)*** (43.98)*** (45.01)*** (44.32)*** (42.06)*** (43.92)*** (47.18)***
Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
from various stakeholders and designation of ma-
nagers who are usually guided by the economic 
interests of controllers.
Table 4 shows regression results applied to 
the dependent variable SHARE5 (minority share-
holder ownership). Results were similar to those 
obtained in Table 3 for some control variables. 
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Such is the case of company returns on assets 
(ROA), financial expenses (FEXP), and firm age 
(AGE). In addition, the variable that quantifies 
growth opportunities (QTOB) does not have a sig-
nificant effect on minority shareholder ownership.
Agency costs (ACOST) had a direct and sta-
tistically significant effect on minority shareholder 
ownership. This impact reflects that these share-
holders increase ownership interest as a means 
of control to monitor corporate management, thus 
preventing wealth expropriation executed by con-
trolling shareholders. On the other hand, firm size 
(SIZE) had the expected positive effect, showing 
that a larger sized company is associated with the 
distribution of share capital.
Corporate policies have significant effects 
on minority shareholder ownership. Company debt 
(LEV) has a positive and non-linear effect, which 
supports the H1 and H2 hypotheses, respectively. 
This finding demonstrates that debt and minority 
shareholder ownership are complementary means 
of control over corporate governance and the dis-
cretionary decisions of controlling shareholders 
(Bae et al., 2002; Baek et al., 2006). However, non-
linearity suggests that complementary debt control 
decreases with higher leverage, indicating a poten-
tial free rider problem in marginal debt monitoring.
Like capital structure, dividend policy (DIV) 
also had a positive and non-linear effect on mino-
rity shareholder ownership. This result confirms 
hypotheses H3 and H4. According to Rozeff (1982), 
dividends allow the distribution of cash flows to mi-
nority shareholders to compensate them for potential 
conflicts of interest with controlling shareholders. 
However, this effect marginally decreases with 
increasing dividends. In fact, maximizing equation 
[1] with respect to dividends in each estimate in-
dicated by Table 4 shows that dividend rates that 
maximize minority shareholder ownership are equal 
to 88.64%. Comparing this figure with the average 
sample dividend of 42.74%, we observed that the 
direct effect of payment policy is broad.
Variables that measure corporate governan-
ce policies had a positive and significant impact, 
except in the case of executive compensation 
policy (EXECP). These results corroborate the H5 
hypothesis and demonstrate that as firms align with 
the OECD corporate governance recommendations, 
minority investor shares increase, mitigating thus 
Table 4. 
Two-limit Tobit regression for minority shareholder ownership, marginal effects
Variables
Dependent variable: Minority shareholder ownership (SHARE5) measured as the percentage of stocks held by 
the fifth largest shareholder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Characteristics of corporate governance
GP 0.284 0.192
(2.32)** (1.98)**
NCAT 0.095 0.103
(2.77)*** (2.22)**
BOARD 0.083 0.096
(1.83)* (1.74)*
STHOLD 0.127 0.143
(3.02)*** (3.65)***
EXECP 0.011 0.004
(0.94) (0.43)
INCONT 0.183 0.203
(3.09)*** (2.86)***
B. Corporate policies
LEV 1.587 1.476 1.637 1.558 1.461 1.701 1.527
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the risk of expropriation, while strengthening the 
protection of investor rights.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Ownership structure has attracted the interest of 
many researchers in recent decades. However, in 
Latin America, this analysis has a systemic relevan-
ce that is different from developed markets and other 
emerging countries. Low levels of legal protection for 
investors have promoted ownership concentration 
over controlling shareholders and facilitated the 
creation of various means of expropriation, affec-
ting minority shareholders. As a country governed 
by French civil law, Chile has not escaped the ten-
dencies of Latin American countries or company 
behaviors. Over the last few years, various cases of 
corporate governance malpractices have occurred, 
affecting minority shareholders and other corporate 
financers. For example, La Polar in 2011, the case 
of CMPC and PISA in 2015, SQM in 2015, Masvida 
en 2017, among others, the effects of which were 
relevant for various stakeholders.
Therefore, the way in which companies de-
termine corporate dividends and financing policies 
could have relevant monitoring effects on ownership 
structure in Chilean companies. According to a vast 
international literature, there is still no consensus 
as to whether these policies have a complementary 
or substitute control effect on ownership structure. 
Moreover, Chile’s entry into the OECD made it ne-
cessary to assess how close or how far corporate 
governance practices were in relation to the recom-
mendations made by this institution. This, together 
with the controlling role of dividend and financing 
policies, would allow us to understand how Chilean 
companies determine ownership structure. 
Variables
Dependent variable: Minority shareholder ownership (SHARE5) measured as the percentage of stocks held by 
the fifth largest shareholder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(4.58)*** (4.01)*** (4.77)*** (3.45)*** (3.85)*** (4.13)*** (3.64)***
LEV2 -0.406 -0.391 -0.493 -0.403 -0.487 -0.501 -0.522
(-2.54)** (-2.47)** (-2.86)*** (-2.38)** (-2.59)*** (-2.91)*** (-2.32)**
DIV 0.083 0.092 0.088 0.084 0.079 0.082 0.086
(1.98)** (2.61)*** (2.46)** (2.67)*** (2.50)** (2.25)** (2.39)**
DIV2 -0.044 -0.051 -0.049 -0.046 -0.047 -0.053 -0.046
(-3.01)*** (-2.89)*** (-2.95)*** (-3.21)*** (-3.07)*** (-3.01)*** (-2.84)***
C. Other control variables
QTOB 1.056 1.027 0.982 1.001 1.203 0.919 1.199
(1.30) (1.33) (1.49) (1.38) (1.21) (1.17) (1.26)
ROA 0.123 0.105 0.118 0.113 0.127 0.121 0.115
(2.86)*** (2.94)*** (2.63)*** (2.84)*** (2.71)*** (2.80)*** (2.53)**
ACOST 0.329 0.357 0.318 0.326 0.332 0.339 0.347
(1.91)* (2.03)** (1.68)* (1.77)* (2.03)** (2.11)** (2.16)**
FEXP 0.223 0.228 0.239 0.237 0.242 0.235 0.219
(3.85)*** (3.77)*** (4.01)*** (3.98)*** (3.44)*** (4.32)*** (3.83)***
SIZE 0.026 0.028 0.021 0.030 0.022 0.024 0.027
(2.99)*** (2.82)*** (2.93)*** (3.03)*** (2.47)** (2.64)*** (2.61)***
AGE 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.007
(0.45) (0.48) (0.51) (0.44) (0.42) (0.49) (0.54)
Dummy sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.33
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
Wald (33.98)*** (34.25)*** (31.93)*** (34.59)*** (35.02)*** (36.85)*** (34.81)***
Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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Our research provides evidence regarding 
these aspects and their implications can be sum-
marized in three points. First, debt policy exercises 
a substitute control role (negative effect) in relation 
to controlling shareholder ownership, and comple-
mentary role (positive effect) regarding minority 
shareholders. This result shows that debt issuance 
allows for an external control of corporate mana-
gement, determined by the interests of controlling 
shareholders, and the protection of minority share-
holder rights by complementing monitoring roles. 
These effects are maintained for a capital structure 
that does not exceed a debt of 62.25%. Non-linear 
effects suggest that, for high debt levels, this policy 
has a positive effect on majority shareholder owner-
ship and a negative effect over minority shareholder 
ownership. In any case, debt is an effective means 
that mitigates wealth expropriation from minority 
shareholders.
Second, dividend policy has a similar effect 
as debt policy, which means an indirect effect on 
controlling shareholder ownership and a direct effect 
over minority shareholder ownership. Since these 
effects are non-linear, the impact ratio is maintained 
for dividend rates that do not exceed 89.38%. If 
we compare this maximum dividend rate with the 
average dividends of sample companies (42.74%), 
we see that the effects of this policy on ownership 
structure are vast. In this way, dividend policy is a 
means that favors the protection of minority sha-
reholder rights and the monitoring of controlling 
shareholder ownership.
Although financing and dividend policies have 
a broad control effect on controlling shareholders 
and support monitoring by minority shareholders, 
their non-linear effect suggests that their effecti-
veness decreases. Thus, for a high level of debt 
(above 62.25%) and high dividend rates (greater 
than 89.38%), it is possible to observe a corporate 
risk transfer, which concentrates ownership in con-
trolling shareholders and expropriates wealth from 
minority shareholders.
Third, corporate governance practices have 
significant effects on the ownership structure of 
Chilean companies. With regard to minority share-
holder ownership, the OECD recommendations for 
better executive functioning, stakeholder relations, 
and internal control policies have positive effects on 
ownership. Such effects suggest that the develop-
ment of good corporate governance practices is a 
means of encouraging the participation of minority 
shareholders and mitigating wealth expropriation. 
This reinforces the internal control roles of investors. 
Corporate governance practices have mixed effects 
for controlling shareholder ownership. The negative 
effects of policies, which improve relationships with 
stakeholders and compensations to executives, are 
contrasted with the positive effects of practices that 
are oriented to board operations and internal control. 
The latter is an indication that ownership concentra-
tion is in opposition to stakeholder rights, who lack 
decision-making power within firms.
Results show that, for Chilean companies, 
financing, dividend, and corporate governance 
policies are an effective means of controlling discre-
tionary ownership concentration, mitigating wealth 
expropriation, and protecting minority shareholder 
rights. In this way, such policies constitute a protec-
tion mechanism not provided by the country’s legal 
environment, since Chile is governed by French 
civil law. 
A future line of research would be to evaluate 
these models over time, as a way of visualizing 
whether Chilean firms indeed adapt their manage-
ment to the corporate governance recommendations 
of the OECD or whether the entry of Chile into this 
organization produced a structural break in gover-
nance form.
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